. A Generic Business Process.
Technological change provides a bewildering number of ways to help achieve these goals. For example, Davenport & Short, [1990] identified 9 different types of competitive benefit to a business process that can be achieved through investments in Information Technology (IT) alone.
The permutations of type of competitive benefit, and the fact that they could appear at any or all points of the business process, complicates rational decision-making about changes in technology. Assessing the benefits for each new investment is impractical in a company of any size, and hence guidance is usually provided by an overall technology strategy. However, as prior studies by Ein-dor et al. [1984] , Benjamin and Scott Morton [1988] , Cronin et al. [1988] and Cecil & Goldstein [1990] show, formulating a good strategy for technology is not enough. To make a significant impact on competitiveness, a technology strategy must support the business strategy and the technology itself must be integrated with the other operations and processes of the firm. This point has long been recognised in a manufacturing context [Skinner, 1969] .
Even with a business process perspective and a coherent technology strategy, however, investment cases guided by a rational desire to eliminate performance bottlenecks can still end up being the responsibility of a single unit. Each unit will tend to focus quite narrowly on its own issues, and hence evolution of the organisation as a whole proceeds with:
1. 'business process'-scoped initiatives using technology to achieve process benefits on the 'cost' side of the balance sheet, and 2. functionally-focused initiatives to add new product/service characteristics at a defined customer interface to protect and develop the 'revenue' side.
The former increases the degree of integration of existing systems while the latter may create new 'islands of technology' [Swenson and Cassidy, 1993] that will have to be integrated in the future.
This integration-introduction-integration cycle increases the coupling between individual systems that are operated by people for whom many of the couplings/dependencies are hidden within the system. This cycle forms an organisational 'intra-structure' that is typically understood by few people within the organisation (a situation often exacerbated by rounds of downsizing and outsourcing) and becomes a constraint to system redesign that promotes incremental approaches to systems reengineering. Successive revisions do little to change core functionality but do tend to obscure the original structure, increase resistance to change, and eventually produce what may be recognised as a 'legacy' system.
II. LEGACY: SYSTEMS AND BUSINESS PROCESSES
Legacy systems can be defined [Brodie and Stonebraker, 1995] as those that significantly resist modification and evolution to meet business requirements, with a consequentially negative impact on competitiveness.
This working definition is chosen carefully from the many alternatives available, because it recognises that a system that is simply 'old' or inflexible is not necessarily a legacy system if there is no business requirement for change. Such systems may simply 'expire' at the point at which the market being served ceases to be economic or appropriate. Expiration was notably the case of the electronic programmable computer built in 1943 by Turing and Communications of AIS Volume 2, Article 24 6 Business Process and Legacy System Reengineering: A Patterns Perspective by A.D. Lloyd, R. Dewar, and R. Pooley his colleagues, which 'expired' in 1945 when the demand for its code-breaking capabilities reduced significantly [Sale, 1999] .
Having identified a legacy system, the now famous decision matrix (e.g., Jacobson and Lindstrom, 1991) shown in Figure 2 demonstrates the choices available to an organisation. Candidates for reengineering are those which are too valuable to the business to be discarded, but are too hard to change/enhance without restructuring. The task of categorising systems in this way is already acknowledged to require great skill [SRAH, 1997; Brown et al., 1996 and Ransom et al., 1998 ], but in this paper we extend the definition of 'value to the business' to include explicit consideration of anticipated changes to the business process itself. At a trivial level this extension might simplify matters, as if the business need disappears then a potential candidate for reengineering may become a candidate for disposal. However, in general this extension adds to the complexity of the analysis as it forces explicit consideration of the impact that changes in business process may have on the choice of technology, and the impact that improvements in technology may have on the design of the business process. An example of the complex choices facing a company with a legacy system was seen by one of the authors in a Life Assurance company . complicates the decision as it potentially challenges the need for the original business process! The benefit of considering both process and technology concurrently is not a new observation. Hammer and Champy, who are widely credited with introducing the term BPR, state that 'a company that cannot change the way it thinks about information technology cannot re-engineer' [Hammer and Champy, 1993] . However, as Heany noted over 30 years ago, IT should not be used to try to bring a failing system under control -automating a mess produces, at best, a faster mess [Heany, 1968] [Coombs and Hull, 1995; Peppard, 1996] it is ultimately the business process that constrains the organisation's performance as a whole.
Though a linear model of 'process then technology' development is clearly problematic, a conclusion that could be drawn from the above is that IT systems should conform to the established/re-designed business process through the purchase/development of bespoke systems. This approach was accepted for large corporate IT projects during the 1980s. However, the rise of pre-packaged solutions to common business processes such as accounting and invoicing, produced with economies of scale and benefiting from compliance with complex legislation, changed the equation. Smaller companies now found an economic incentive to 'fit' their business process to the standard solution.
During the 1990s, pre-packaged solutions were increasingly accepted by large companies. These companies also saw standard solutions provided by market leaders as a means of benchmarking best practice. The prepackaged market grew quickly in the mid 1990s, with the number one reason for buying the market leading product, SAP R/3, given perhaps not surprisingly as business process re-engineering [Newswire, 1999] . Though 'BPR' as a justification for investment was overtaken by 'ERP', process reengineering is still identified as a critical step in achieving returns on the investment [Manchester, 1999] .
Accepted wisdom might now therefore be re-expressed as 'modify' rather than 'make'. Kempis & Ringbeck [1998] , who made detailed studies of 70 manufacturers across Europe, the United States and Asia, support this aphorism. They classified the companies surveyed according to the efficiency (IT cost as a percentage of revenues, plus project management performance against schedule and budget) and effectiveness (the availability, functionality, and utilisation rates of IT applications for each core business process).
Although over 60% of their sample used functionally integrated standard software, this figure varied significantly over the segments identified. However, standard software is not always a rational choice. Whilst it can help a company to make its cost base competitive, the values that differentiate its products from the competition may arise from unique aspects of its business process. In these cases, the need to modify a standard solution heavily rather than the business process may eliminate the economic advantage [Kempis & Ringbeck, 1998 ]. Ultimately, internal development is the surest way of protecting a unique competitive strength.
What is clear from the above analysis is that the design of large IT systems is extremely hard to separate from the design of business processes.
The question then arises: can legacy computer systems 'lock-in' inefficient or even redundant 'legacy' business processes?
A review of the BPR literature shows that many occasions exist where people are employed to perform tasks that are supported by IT but for which there is no business case. For example, when Ford compared its operations to Mazda, it discovered that its Accounts Payable department employed 500 people to match 14 documents, whereas Mazda employed only 5 people to perform the same function. The subsequent re-design cut the number of document matches to 3 and reduced the headcount by 75% [Talwar, 1993] .
Many of Ford's documents proved to be redundant, however because the IT system helped manage the process of checking those documents, IT also helped to 'lock-in' the need for them. IT was acting as a barrier to the redesign of the process.
The literature on the learning organisation also supports this argument. Lambert and Peppard [1993] observe that the patterns of behaviour in large organisations are typically 'hard-wired' into the system through organisational structure, incentive schemes, hiring and promotion practice, and notably information systems. 
III. PATTERNS AS AN APPROACH
The architect and philosopher Christopher Alexander introduced the concept of generally applicable patterns in the late 1970s [Alexander et al. 1977 , Alexander 1979 . He recognised that certain attributes in building and solution "a million times over, without ever doing it the same way twice" [Alexander, 1977] .
We aim to understand how experienced practitioners undertake the reengineering of legacy systems, so that we can develop better techniques and material for communicating that expertise. Such expertise will necessarily draw on a number of fields, and hence it is important that any emerging 'language' uses constructs that will be meaningful to all the communities who are able to contribute expertise. Though patterns are a relatively recent development, they have already been applied to design [Gamma et al., 1995] , the software development process [Cunningham, 1995; Coplien, 1995] , organisational patterns [Coplien, 1997] , software process improvement [Appleton, 1997] , and directly to business process reengineering by Beedle [1997] . Although these classes of patterns are all different, the apparent suitability of patterns for codifying and communicating expertise in these complementary disciplines makes it natural to consider patterns as an approach also to the reengineering problem.
Patterns lead to a number of important difficulties. Two of the most • the level of abstraction chosen, and
• the treatment of patterns that encapsulate the opportunities of new technology.
Both of these difficulties impact the effectiveness and risk of using this technique to communicate expertise. If the level of abstraction is too detailed, patterns become over-specialised and unwieldy. If they are too abstract then they start to assume potentially dangerous levels of domain knowledge by the user. Any pattern that arises from a new technology is, by definition, unproven and may be exceptionally risky, but without the possibility of adapting to technical change, any language will become obsolete. After all, how limiting might Alexander's patterns be for a designer with a new building material, or one who is expected to design a living space in outer space! These issues are being addressed in the wider pattern community and were discussed by the authors in Dewar et al. (1999) .
In view of the need to define a formal structure that allows for a high level of abstraction without making patterns unwieldy, and which prevents new patterns from being mistaken for established patterns, we propose the inclusion of two further elements: Status and Known Uses. Status, describes the level of confidence which may be placed in the pattern, and Known Uses describes cases where the pattern was used successfully, giving specific names of products or companies.
The elements of the systems reengineering pattern are therefore:
• Name a few words, describing as evocatively as possible, the overall nature of the pattern.
• Status a few words, describing how well established the pattern is (see 'Known uses'). One important distinction between a design pattern and a systems reengineering pattern is whether a related business process exists. A reengineering pattern must apply to a system which already exists and for which there is an existing case for both the system itself and the related business process. An existing process need not be true for a design pattern.
In a reengineering pattern therefore, the context must reflect both the technical and business imperatives. This distinction is important because it
gives an opportunity to achieve the real communication between business and technical communities that is required for coherent technical and business strategies. Similarly, a legacy system can only be reengineered into an evolvable system capable of responding to, or anticipating, business process needs if this communication can also take place between domain specialists throughout the reengineering process. Real communication requires not just a common language, but also a common conceptual base if the classic problems with literal translations are to be avoided. We therefore propose that by embedding concepts of competitive advantage we enhance the potential for a common focus on what is specifically required by the organisation to improve the competitiveness of its business processes.
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE
Though economists agree about the importance of investment in technology for the growth of economies [Boltho, 1996] , attempts to uncover relationships between IT investment and competitiveness at the level of the firm produced rather inconclusive results. Studies carried out across Europe [OECD, 1988] , supported by related studies in the US [Cronin, 1988 , Strassman, 1990 , showed no positive correlation between expenditure on IT and changes in productivity, and established what came to be known as the "productivity paradox" of investments in IT during the 1980s. This analysis was followed with notable IT project failures in the early 1990s, such as the London Stock Exchange's Taurus, leading some commentators to observe that far from leading to increases in productivity, IT investment led to 'wealth destruction' [Kirkpatrick, 1994; HMSO, 1994] . Brynjolfsson and Hitt later challenged this productivity paradox in their 1996 study of a new data set, on which they applied many of the same tests and yet were able to find significant evidence of productivity increases at a firm level. Though they challenged the productivity paradox, this did not necessarily invalidate the earlier studies as increased productivity might have arisen from industry-wide changes in business and IT strategy in the late 1980s, which they raised as a possibility but did not test. Willcocks and Lester (1997) reinforced the Brynjolfsson and Hitt results in their review by highlighting deficiencies in evaluation practice at a macroeconomic level, but also identifying deficiencies in approaches to assessing benefits at an organisational level. The former obscures the true picture, whilst the latter inhibits alignment of business and technology strategies and thereby helps to propagate the paradox.
The lack of an over-all consensus in these studies may be partly explained by their focus on an aggregate measure of firm performance, i.e.
productivity, which owes as much to the choice of business strategy as to how well the investment is aligned with, and advances that strategy. Any direct link between IT investment and a competitive advantage is further complicated by to the strong dependence of competitiveness on exogenous variables that include, naturally, the competition. If they too are investing heavily in IT, then unless the market in which the firms compete is growing, then no aggregate productivity increase will be registered in the short term.
Since an absolute competitive advantage cannot be determined before an investment in IT takes place, any generalisable approach to competitiveness needs to consider generic measures of competitiveness.
These measures include:
o the ability to produce a product/service faster (Speed) and cheaper A company may compete on any or all of these dimensions, as long as they contribute to a value that can be communicated to the customer. It is this 'communicated value' that turns a generic competitiveness improvement into an improvement of the company's competitiveness in its own markets, though again, the gain may not prove sufficient to provide the company with a competitive advantage.
These concerns about generic and specific competitive advantage are illustrated in Figure 4 in relation to organisational hierarchy and system architecture. Here it is the business strategy, championed by the CEO, that will drive the competitive moves of the organisation, and hence it is the business strategy that contains the factors which are believed to be critical for competition in the organisation's own markets. If this strategy is right, and is not pre-empted by competitive moves elsewhere, then a coherent technology strategy should lead to improvements in capability that translate into increased productivity. [Architectural hierarchy after Brown et al. [1998] ].
A system architect, however, lies between the Business and Technology strategists and the application programmer. Although they are responsible for designing systems to support the business strategy and will usually be aware of any constraints that the technology strategy imposes, Principal amongst these is the potential for re-using design patterns which specify something about the structure of the target system, where that target has been identified as a solution within a systems reengineering pattern ( Figure 10 , Section V).
This theme of re-use is one of a number of guiding principles for developing systems reengineering patterns (Dewar et al., 1999) 
IV. EXAMPLE PATTERNS
If patterns are to be useful to people at different levels of the organisational hierarchy in Figure 4 , they will have to reflect solutions within contexts at those levels. These contexts differ widely. Hence systems reengineering patterns at, say, a senior management level are likely to capture solutions reflecting a much broader range of concerns than those of a design engineer. In pure systems engineering terms these patterns may prove too general to be applied directly to a target system design. However, this Stevens & Pooley [1998] ) is a pattern that can help liberate the data and functionality contained within the legacy system and produce a system which itself should be easier to evolve in future.
Name: Divide and Modernise
Status: Draft.
Context:
Technical context: You have a legacy system whose technology is obsolete and soon to be unsupported. 
Consequences:
You should consider whether to migrate the code or the data first depending on your own priorities and resources. Once the code (or data)
is migrated you have a stable working system using an interim gateway.
When the migration of the data (or code) starts, the gateway will have to be replaced or modified. Whichever you choose to migrate first, constructing the gateways is non-trivial, requiring careful planning. Over-all, work proceeds in distinct manageable phases. Even if a requirements explosion does overtake the final restructuring step, the main aim, that of removing the dependency of the functionality on the obsolete technology, will have been achieved. In addition, maintenance of the smaller legacy is now less costly and risky. On the negative side, code and data are migrated before the new requirements of the system are analysed, which means that some of this effort may turn out to have been wasted.
Known uses:
This pattern is being used in BT (British Telecommunications plc) as they attempt to migrate data and functionality away from their monolithic Customer Service System (CSS) [Harrison, 1997] . It is only one of a number of strategies being pursued, such as Middleware and Wrapping.
Another example can be drawn from Brodie and Stonebraker's [1995, pp 67-102] legacy migration work for a US Telco and Bank. Here they used a combination of moving the data first (forward migration) and the applications first (reverse migration) to achieve their aims. In both these cases Divide and
Modernise was effectively applied iteratively until all the legacy was migrated. 
Name: Wrapping
Context:
Technical context: A system, or several sub-systems, whose interface is not ideal but where the underlying code and data are acceptable or are less urgently in need of reengineering. The interface is not readily decomposable from the rest of the system which makes re-writing it difficult and risky.
Business context: Users of a system, paying customers or internal operators, need a more efficient means to access data or invoke processes.
At the same time, the current system performs essential functions for the business. These inefficiencies mean competitors threaten to win business opportunities and to take existing business away. The competitive elements here are improving the Speed of response and improving the service Quality of the system through enhancing ease of use.
Problem: How can the system interface be made more efficient? Wrapping was also used to add a Web-based interface to a commandline driven legacy system [Phanouriou and Abrams, 1997] . One of the authors has first hand experience of this reengineering pattern when consulting for a major UK steel manufacturer, where Smalltalk-based object oriented user access to an existing corporate database was being planned. Sneed and Majnar [1998] describe a banking application of wrapping where they encapsulated existing mainframe software components so that they can be used in a distributed object-oriented system. Their findings are:
1. inevitably the wrapped program will need modification in order to interact with the wrapper; 2. the bottleneck and weakest link in the chain is the server to host communication, so special attention should be given to its capacity and reliability;
3. testing the resulting system is time consuming.
Name: Middleware
Status: Draft. 
Context:

Consequences:
The legacy is effectively wrapped. New applications can be distributed. They can re-use the existing valuable functionality and data on the legacy without adding coupling and complexity ( Figure 6 ). In addition, the operators of the new applications only have to deal with one familiar interface and will be unaware that they are interacting with other systems. • implications for reliability of existing product features;
• implications for efficiency of existing products;
• expectations of existing customers;
• likelihood of further modifications in the future.
The reengineering implications can be seen as capturing the expertise embodied in the decision that it is possible and desirable to migrate in a certain incremental way to a new system which itself makes use of those design patterns, rather than writing a new system from scratch.
Name: Externalising an internal representation
Context:
Technical context: A system in which data is processed notionally in a number of phases, where the phases are invoked by a driver program which itself is easily modified. Currently the system is tightly coupled, with each phase communicating with its predecessor and successor and taking no account of others. Such an arrangement, sometimes referred to as a pipelined architecture, is shown in Figure 7 . requirement is going to be regularly repeated. At the same time, there is a need to maintain the system's existing functionality -especially its reliability.
The competitive element here is Flexibility.
Problem: Phases are not currently well encapsulated. Wherever two phases are currently consecutive, they always share an internal data representation which is adapted to the needs of those two specific phases, not designed to be an interface format for arbitrary processing. Adding the new optional phases to the system as it stands requires either that functionality of the existing phases be duplicated, or that some optional phase use the "internal"
format which was not designed as an interface format. Either course will create unacceptable maintenance problems in this context, given that there is an anticipated need to add further phases in future. In addition, the current system's functionality must not be compromised, otherwise existing customers may move to competing products. formats depending on what its successor will be. Third, modify the old subsequent phase to input the new format, at which point the old format can be abandoned, and the ability of the old first phase to output the old internal format can be removed, as shown in Figure 9 . The structure of the new system is now modular, with the driver program as a Mediator, as in the design pattern [Gamma et al., 1995] . Problem: How do I get the vendor to tackle the outstanding issues?
Solution: Call a war room with all interested external and internal parties.
Prioritise issues and agree on actions and time scales.
Consequences: By having all parties together, the scale of the problem can be seen. 
V. USING PATTERNS
The 'managing process' patterns presented in section 4 should be treated with great care. They are not intended to be prescriptive solutions or an 'ABC' of management. For example, whilst the coercion described in War Room can produce immediate compliance it can also have a number of negative side effects [Vecchio, 1991] . Rather, these particular patterns are a way of capturing and presenting knowledge about the process of reengineering which establishes the context in which the reengineering was performed and identifies people within the organisation who were responsible for managing the process. These are the people with whom a broader understanding of the problem and solution domains can be achieved, and tracking these people is an important aspect of knowledge management. The combined activities of using these two different types of pattern to identify a solution, a sequence of activities required to reach the solution, and methods for managing the process of implementing the solution is shown in Figure 10 .
Here integration of a particular Legacy system with Enterprise systems leads a system architect to a review a catalogue of reengineering patterns, and one is selected that resolves (aligns) stated technology and business strategies. For example, Wrapping (Section 4) may be seen as the lowest cost and quickest technical solution for dealing with a legacy system interface, but it may serve to further obscure the underlying structure of the system and 
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Senior executives should be all too familiar with the specific issues that affect their organisation's competitiveness and the competencies that need to be preserved or developed. They may use this knowledge to help define which of their business processes and technical sub-systems need to be reengineered, but they are unlikely to appreciate the specific benefits that attend one technical system's design versus another. Conversely, system architects and application programmers understand in detail what their technical choices will do to the system's characteristics, but will be less aware of how such change will specifically impact the competitiveness of their organisation. Resolving these two valuable perspectives in a way that maximises the potential for competitive advantage and minimises risk is recognised as a significant management challenge for which no over-all solution exists, but elements of good practice have been identified. Accepted wisdom results in system development that is often guided by objectives 'handed down' from an over-all business strategy, constrained by a technology strategy, and driven by over-all beliefs that certain characteristics, such as integration, are desirable.
The decision to proceed with an information systems project is typically This organisational 'intra-structure' complicates the future reengineering of business or technical systems, increases the risks associated with change, and tends to promote incremental approaches to systems reengineering that do little to change the core functionality. Successive revisions tend to obscure the original structure, increase resistance to change, and eventually produce what may be recognised as a 'legacy' system. These revisions, in turn, may 'lock-in' redundant elements of business processes, reduce an organisation's ability to adapt to market changes and consequently erode competitiveness.
Reversing this trend still requires that legacy system reengineering is based on technical choices that are consistent with the organisation's technology strategy. If reengineering is going to lead to a more competitive business process over-all. it will also require that technical design choices ( Figure 4) include consideration of how each option supports the business strategy, Pattern languages are recognised for their ability to communicate expertise about technical choices and implementation approaches. It may be argued that their use on this basis alone could result in a reengineered system that makes the greatest contribution to generic factors of competition.
However, this paper notes that investment decisions guided by considering only generic factors of competition need not lead to any direct improvement in competitiveness for the organisation as a whole. We therefore propose that 'systems reengineering patterns' formally incorporate factors relating to generic competitiveness, such as Speed, Cost, Quality and Flexibility, but use these factors to communicate issues relating to the specific competitive environment faced by the firm. This 'context' can then be used to help select systems reengineering patterns from a catalogue, and the embedded concepts of generic competitiveness used to establish a dialogue between the business and technical domains that resolves the technical and business imperatives. 
